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Non  Parametric Estimation of Conditional and Unconditional Loan Portfolio 
Loss Distributions with Public Credit Registry Data 
 
Matías Alfredo Gutiérrez Girault1 
June, 2007 
Abstract 
Employing a resampling-based Monte Carlo simulation developed in Carey (2000, 
1998) and Majnoni, Miller and Powell (2004), in this paper we estimate conditional 
and unconditional loss distributions for loan portfolios of argentine banks in the period 
1999-2004, controlling by type of borrower and type of bank. The exercise, 
performed with data contained in the public credit registry of the Central Bank of 
Argentina, yields economic estimates of expected and unexpected losses useful in 
bank supervision and in the prudential regulation of credit risk. 
 
I. Introduction 
In the last decade, attempts to model portfolio credit losses have proliferated, 
the most known among them being CreditRisk+ (Credit Suisse Financial Products 
(1997)), CreditMetricsTM (J.P. Morgan (1997)), KMVs Portfolio Manager (O. A.  
Vasicek (1984)), McKinseys CreditPortfolio View (Wilson (1987, 1998)) and recently, 
the Asymptotic Single Risk Factor Model (Gordy (2002)), featured in Basel IIs 
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Internal Ratings Based approach. While on the one hand these model-based 
approaches yield similar and plausible results, on the other they rely on parametric 
assumptions to assess the likelihood of losses in the loan portfolios, therefore being 
subject to model risk, i.e., the risk of obtaining misleading results as a consequence 
of mistaken assumptions regarding the structure of the model (such as number of 
systematic factors or the nature of assets correlations) or the behaviour of random 
variables (such as the distribution of the systematic factor, for example gaussian in 
the IRB approach). In addition to this, the loss distributions are obtained using 
individual loans estimated default probabilities (PDs) as an input. This introduces 
another source of risk, as a result of the simplifying assumptions embedded in the 
probit models or logistic regressions used to estimate those PDs. 
Following the approach proposed in Carey (2000, 1998), we use a resampling-
based Monte Carlo simulation to estimate conditional and unconditional distributions 
for the losses observed in loan portfolios, using the data contained in the public credit 
registry of the Central Bank of Argentina, the Central de Deudores del Sistema 
Financiero (CENDEU). The use of resampling-based procedures in statistics gained 
prominence in the last decades, in particular as from the mid 70s with the 
introduction of Efrons bootstrapping procedure (Efron (1979)). Efrons non-
parametric bootstrap is also a resampling technique, useful to infer the distribution of 
test statistics. The bootstrap procedure estimates a distribution resampling 
repeatedly from one sample, and computing the value of the desired statistic after 
each iteration.  
Conditional distributions are computed for each of the five years comprised 
between 1999 and 2004, while the estimation of unconditional distributions covers 
the whole period altogether. To control for differences in credit risk management 
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policies and other factors that may influence the shape of the distribution, separate 
estimations are carried out for different types of banks and borrowers. The estimated 
distributions allow the computation of expected losses and measures of unexpected 
losses at various confidence levels. These economic measures of risk are useful to 
detect discrepancies with their regulatory counterpart, namely provisioning and 
capital requirements for credit risk. In addition to this, the results can be used to 
evaluate the extent to which an IRB approach is suitable to specific portfolios in an 
emerging economy, and in particular if its adoption would deliver the desired level of 
risk coverage. Adapting an exercise performed in Majnoni, Miller and Powell (2004), 
with the expected losses associated to the unconditional distributions and using their 
corresponding loss rate as a proxy of the average PD in the portfolio, we solve for an 
average LGD consistent with that expected loss. Having obtained these risk 
dimensions, we compute the capital requirement that would result from the IRB 
approach and we compare the results with the Monte Carlo simulated unexpected 
loss at the 99.9% confidence level. The paper is organized as follows: section II 
describes the data used in the estimations, while section III introduces the 
methodology: the resampling-based Monte Carlo simulation. Section IV comments 
the results and compares the capital requirements that would result from this 
methodology with those obtained with the IRB approach. Finally, section V presents 
the conclusions. 
 
II. Description of the Data 
The sample used in the estimation of the loan loss distributions was 
constructed with information obtained from the public credit registry of the Central 
Bank of Argentina (BCRA), the Central de Deudores del Sistema Financiero 
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(CENDEU). Data of December of each of the years in the period 1999 to 2003 was 
included in the sample: identification of the borrower, identification of the creditor 
(bank and non-bank financial institutions), type of borrower (commercial, SME or 
retail), business sector, total outstanding debt with the creditor, amount collateralised 
(with eligible financial or real assets) and risk classification one year ahead. 
Following detailed guidelines set by the BCRA, risk classifications are 
assigned to borrowers (not to their credits) by each of their creditors (individuals with 
operations with many banks receive one risk classification by each creditor) and 
range between 1 and 52 depending on the perceived risk of each borrower. In the 
case of retail borrowers, the risk classification depends on their payment behaviour, 
in particular of the days past due, with borrowers having less than 90 days past due 
being classified 1 or 2. On the other hand, for commercial borrowers the relationship 
between days in arrears and the risk classification is less direct, and there are more 
criteria other than payment behaviour to decide how the firm will be classified, such 
as the projected cash-flow, business sector, etc.  
Tables I and II depict the characteristics of the information contained in 
CENDEU, which registers every outstanding debt above AR$50 (US$16). 
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Table I. Distribution of Borrowers by Risk Classification  
 Non Financial Private Sector   
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Fraction of Borrowers per Risk Classification 
1 80% 78% 74% 61% 66% 
2 5% 5% 5% 5% 2% 
3 3% 3% 3% 3% 1% 
4 4% 4% 4% 6% 2% 
5 8% 10% 13% 25% 27% 
6 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
Total 7.711.858 7.945.971 8.265.319 6.321.842 6.034.802 
Source: Superintendencia de Entidades Financieras y Cambiarias, BCRA. Figures are year-end. 
Table II. Outstanding Debt by Risk Classification (AR$ millions) 
 Non Financial Private Sector  
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Fraction of Debt per Risk Classification 
1 77% 75% 69% 43% 47% 
2 5% 4% 5% 10% 8% 
3 2% 3% 3% 10% 5% 
4 5% 6% 6% 11% 8% 
5 10% 11% 16% 25% 30% 
6 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 
Total 79.291 75.345 67.329 55.535 49.589 
Source: Superintendencia de Entidades Financieras y Cambiarias, BCRA. Figures are year-end. 
After experiencing years of growth, the argentine economy entered a 
recession in 1999, which among other consequences affected banks loan portfolios 
with a reduction of the share of performing borrowers (i.e., borrowers classified 1 or 
2). While on December 1999 performing borrowers and their corresponding 
obligations represented respectively 85% and 82% of the total, these shares where 
79% and 74% in 2001. After three years of stagnation, though, the crisis unfolded in 
2002, triggered by a deposit freeze, the devaluation of the argentine peso and the 
default of the public debt, dragging the economy into a more severe recession with 
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real GDP shrinking 11% that year. The crisis reinforced the worsening of banks loan 
portfolios, increasing the fraction of non-performing borrowers and debt, and 
reducing the depth of the financial system. Bank credit to the non-financial private 
sector fell from 23.3% of GDP in December 1999, to 19.2% in December 2001 and 
7.5% in December 2003. Besides, by the end of 2003 nearly 50% of the outstanding 
bank credit to the non-financial private sector was in default.  
 
III. Methodology 
Following the approach employed in Carey (2000, 1998) we use a resampling-
based Monte Carlo simulation to estimate conditional and unconditional distributions 
of the annual losses observed in banks loan portfolios, using the data contained in 
the public credit registry of the Central Bank of Argentina, Central de Deudores del 
Sistema Financiero (CENDEU). The computations are performed controlling by type 
of obligor or portfolio (corporate, SME and retail) and by type of financial institution 
(bank and non-bank, public, foreign owned, cooperative, etc.). Therefore, for each 
year and each type of bank three conditional distributions are obtained, as well as 
one unconditional distribution for each combination of type of bank and portfolio. By 
this token, should differences exist in the credit policies followed by different types of 
institutions (i.e. private banks vs. public banks, banks vs. financial companies) these 
are likely to be captured by the shape of their respective distributions. 
As explained in the introduction, the objective of the paper is to obtain 
conditional distributions for each of the five years comprised in the period 1999-2004: 
1999-2000, 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003 and 2003-2004. These estimates are 
deemed as conditional since, for sufficiently diversified or fine grained portfolios, their 
shape will generally depend on the realization of the systematic factor(s) and on 
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obligors asset or default correlation. In this paper, we assume that there is only one 
systematic factor affecting obligors credit stance, which is the state of the economy 
and is proxied by the observed behaviour of the GDP.  
For each portfolio and type of bank an unconditional distribution is also 
computed. In this case, for each combination of portfolio and type of bank the 
behaviour of the borrowers in the period 1999-2004 is taken altogether in the 
simulation, therefore allowing for the coexistence of different patterns of credit risk in 
response to different realizations of the systematic factor. 
Before estimating a conditional distribution a sub-set of the obligors 
population is assembled; this sub-set will later be used to perform the resampling. 
First, from the total population of obligors belonging to the non-financial private sector 
only those with a positive amount of outstanding debt at the outset of the chosen 
period are retained. Second, given that the conditional distribution is computed for 
one particular combination of type of bank and portfolio, we choose those borrowers 
that meet this criteria. Third, borrowers that are already in default at the outset of 
each period are removed from the sample. Besides, some obligors that exist at the 
outset of a period disappear from the CENDEU during the following 12 months. This 
is because they may either have defaulted, been written-off and removed from the 
banks balance sheet and from CENDEU, or they may have cancelled their debts and 
also been deleted from the CENDEU. In both cases they are removed from the 
sample as well; the empirical evidence found in Balzarotti, Gutiérrez Girault and 
Vallés (2006) shows that the potential bias introduced by removing these borrowers 
is negligible. For the remaining borrowers, their initial total indebtedness and eligible 
collateral with the bank are computed, and their risk classification in that bank one 
year ahead, be it indicative of default or not, is attached.  
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The sample constructed in this way enables the computation of an observed 
default rate and, together with assumptions regarding recovery rates, of a loss rate. 
The aforementioned procedure, while informative as to the loss experienced in the 
chosen portfolio, is a snapshot which yields no additional information such as what 
other values the loss rate may have taken and with what probability, what is the 
average loss rate or, perhaps more importantly, what are the worse loss rates that 
the portfolio may suffer, no matter how unlikely they are. Namely, we are interested 
in knowing the range of possible values that loan portfolios losses may take with 
their associated probability, which is the output of our resampling-based Monte Carlo 
simulation. 
To perform the Monte Carlo simulation we construct many simulated portfolios 
by drawing borrowers randomly and with replacement from the corresponding sub-
set for which the distribution is to be computed. When simulating the portfolios we 
tried to mimic as far as possible the actual characteristics of the segment under 
study. Therefore, besides limiting the data to those borrowers that met the 
characteristics of the portfolios to be modelled (type of borrower and of bank), the 
size of the simulated portfolios (measured by the number of obligors in them) was set 
to equal the average number of obligors in the portfolio under study, with a cap of 
500 obligors for corporates and 1,000 for SMEs and retail. For example, when 
simulating the distribution of corporate clients of foreign banks, the simulated 
portfolios were constructed drawing randomly from a pool of corporate borrowers of 
foreign banks, with the restriction that the size of each portfolio matched the average 
size of this sort of portfolio, subject to the mentioned cap. In addition to this, the 
resampling introduces a source of randomness, and of error, in the results, which 
shrinks with the number of portfolios simulated. Our results didnt show a clear 
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pattern of change when increasing the number of resamples from 5,000 to 20,000. 
Therefore, to ease the speed of computation but keeping the error as low as possible 
we limited the number of iterations to 10,000. Consequently, the results that follow in 
the paper were obtained resampling 10,000 portfolios according to the already 
explained data generation process. Having simulated 10,000 portfolios of the desired 
group of borrowers, the loss rate is estimated for each portfolio. The resulting set of 
10,000 loss rates, which can be displayed diagrammatically in a histogram, 
constitutes our estimated loan loss distribution.  
To illustrate the procedure with an example, assume we want to understand 
the behaviour of the loss rate of loans granted by foreign banks to corporate 
borrowers in a specific period, such as December 2002  December 2003. After 
removing the borrowers already in default in December 2002, as well as those that 
disappeared during the course of the year, we attach to the remaining ones their risk 
classification in December 2003. Subsequently we simulate 10,000 portfolios drawing 
randomly from the sub-set of borrowers with the restriction that the number of 
obligors is consistent with the observed size of the portfolio being analysed, and for 
each simulated portfolio we compute the loss rate. Finally, with the 10,000 loss rates 
we compute the average (expected) loss and different percentiles that will provide us 
with measures of unexpected losses, at various confidence levels.   
Conditional distributions summarize the potential credit losses that banks may 
experience as a result of credit events in one particular year and thus, for one 
particular realization of the systematic factor (the behaviour of the GDP). 
Conditioning in the realization of the systematic factor, the variability of the portfolio 
losses displayed in the distribution results from the randomness introduced by the 
resampling procedure coupled with the observed default rate in the assembled sub-
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set, the heterogeneity of the loans in the portfolio and the existence of collaterals. 
However, when comparing observed loss rates in different periods of time, their 
difference may result not only from the abovementioned factors but also from the 
state of the economy. The unconditional distribution may also be understood as 
being a weighted average of the distributions observed in different realizations of the 
systematic factor, as a result of which the dynamic of the borrowers switches from 
one of low risk to a dynamic of high risk. Thus, the unconditional distribution is the 
mixture of conditional distributions that switch between regimes of high or low risk 
according to the observed realizations of the systematic factor. Figure I shows an 
example of the interpretation of unconditional distributions as the summation of 
densities corresponding to different regimes, weighted by the likelihood of occurrence 
of each regime3.  
Figure I. Unconditional distributions as mixture-distributions 
  In Figure I f(y/s=b) represents the distribution of yt/st=b, which is assumed to 
be normal with mean 2 and variance 8, and that may represent the behaviour of 
losses in bad realizations of the systematic factor (s=b) (i.e., yt/st = b ~ N(2,8)). On 
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the other hand, representing the behaviour of losses in good realizations of the 
systematic factor the graph shows yt/st = g ~ N(0,1). The unconditional distribution is 
obtained as the vertical summation of densities for each level of loss, weighted by the 
probability of occurrence of each state of the economy. The difference between the 
two conditional densities is reflecting that during economic downturns credit losses 
are higher on average and more volatile. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
The principal results of the simulations are summarized in tables III and IV. In 
Table III we assume that in each defaulted loan the loss equals 50% of the 
uncovered tranche of the exposure. Results in Table IV reflect a much conservative 
stance and assume the loss amounts to 100% of the uncovered tranche plus 50% of 
the collateral. Therefore the difference in the expected and unexpected losses for the 
same portfolio (i.e., type of borrower and of bank) in both tables is the assumption 
regarding the recoveries or the effective Loss Given Default (LGD), since in both 
cases the underlying loss rate is the same. In what follows, the discussion will be 
centred on the results displayed in the first table. Nevertheless, and taking into 
consideration that during economic downturns LGDs are likely to be larger than in 
normal times, since the market value of collaterals may decline, the results shown in 
Table IV are more suitable to assess the behaviour of credit losses during deep 
recessions, such as the 2001-2002 period.  
 Table III shows, for each type of bank and borrower, the resampled conditional 
expected and unexpected losses. In each case the simulations were computed for 
each of the abovementioned 12-month periods, while on the other hand the 
unconditional estimates correspond to the whole 1999-2004 period. Unexpected 
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losses are those that exceed the expected ones, and that usually correspond to the 
90th, 95th, 99th and 99.9th percentiles. The latter, however, are of particular relevance 
since most model-based portfolio models yield estimates of the unexpected loss at 
this confidence level, such as Basel IIs IRB. Therefore, to facilitate the comparability 
of results with the model-based alternatives only the unexpected losses at the 99.9% 
confidence are shown. 
Table III. Expected and Unexpected Losses (99.9% confidence level) 
- Scenario I: loss equals 50% of uncovered exposure - 
 1999 - 2000 2000 - 2001 2001 - 2002 2002 - 2003 2003 - 2004 Unconditional 
 EL UL EL UL EL UL EL UL EL UL EL UL 
Real GDP Growth 
 -0,8% -4,4% -10,9% 8,8% 9%  
National State Banks 
Corporates 2,0% 4,9% 7,2% 14,9% 4,3% 7,4% 2,8% 8,9% 1,2% 6,9% 3,6% 11,4% 
SMEs - - - - - - 4,3% 6,2% 0,3% 1,2% 1,7% 3,6% 
Retail 1,2% 1,3% 1,4% 2,2% 3,3% 2,9% 1,4% 2,2% 2,6% 10,0% 1,4% 1,3% 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
Corporates 5,1% 15,4% 7,9% 21,2% 12,7% 21,8% 0,8% 12,7% 0,3% 6,5% 6,8% 20,4% 
SMEs - - 9,7% 14,0% 12,3% 13,0% 0,6% 4,4% 1,0% 8,2% 8,0% 20,4% 
Retail 4,9% 4,7% 4,8% 4,0% 8,7% 4,2% 2,1% 1,5% 3,0% 2,2% 5,4% 4,7% 
Wholesale and Investment Banks 
Corporates 0,0% 0,0% 0,2% 2,1% 5,4% 21,1% 0,0% 0,9% 0,0% 0,0% 1,2% 19,5% 
Retail 1,6% 13,8% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,7% 12,1% 
Large Retail Banks 
Corporates 1,6% 4,9% 2,7% 7,8% 11,4% 14,6% 1,4% 3,3% 0,7% 1,4% 3,7% 7,4% 
SMEs - - 3,1% 2,5% 8,7% 4,1% 0,9% 1,8% 1,3% 2,5% 4,1% 3,2% 
Retail 2,4% 3,4% 2,2% 2,4% 4,2% 2,8% 0,5% 1,3% 0,3% 5,3% 2,2% 3,2% 
Medium-Sized Retail Banks 
Corporates 1,5% 4,2% 2,2% 9,2% 11,2% 15,8% 1,6% 8,2% 0,2% 1,0% 3,6% 11,1% 
SMEs - - 3,1% 2,2% 9,1% 3,5% 1,6% 3,4% 1,1% 2,3% 4,0% 2,7% 
Retail 2,9% 3,8% 2,9% 6,9% 5,7% 4,0% 1,0% 3,5% 0,7% 2,9% 3,6% 6,7% 
Small Retail Banks 
Corporates 3,8% 12,8% 4,1% 11,4% 10,0% 22,0% 0,7% 12,1% 0,4% 2,8% 3,9% 19,5% 
SMEs - - 4,0% 9,6% 8,9% 6,5% 3,5% 13,1% 4,6% 8,7% 7,1% 7,6% 
Retail 5,9% 8,0% 5,5% 9,7% 8,1% 6,3% 2,1% 4,0% 2,1% 5,1% 5,1% 9,2% 
Other Wholesale and Investment Banks 
Corporates 2,5% 9,0% 2,2% 9,6% 8,3% 20,9% 4,5% 28,9% 0,5% 6,0% 3,4% 17,5% 
SMEs - - 7,9% 8,8% 11,5% 13,7% 3,0% 10,5% 4,6% 7,9% 7,5% 13,8% 
Retail 7,1% 9,9% 8,1% 9,5% 10,1% 9,5% 4,4% 6,2% 0,4% 4,4% 6,4% 9,1% 
Provincial and Municipal Banks 
Corporates 3,0% 11,2% 5,5% 26,1% 5,9% 11,8% 4,8% 32,7% 2,2% 12,6% 4,5% 28,1% 
SMEs - - 5,9% 2,9% 12,0% 3,4% 1,9% 2,2% 5,9% 3,5% 7,4% 3,2% 
Retail 3,2% 3,2% 2,8% 3,0% 4,2% 3,1% 0,7% 1,8% 1,3% 2,4% 3,7% 16,6% 
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Table IV. Expected and Unexpected Losses (99.9% confidence level) 
 - Scenario II: loss equals uncovered exposure plus 50% of collateral - 
 1999 - 2000 2000 - 2001 2001 - 2002 2002 - 2003 2003 - 2004 Unconditional 
 EL UL EL UL EL UL EL UL EL UL EL UL 
Real GDP Growth 
 -0,8% -4,4% -10,9% 8,8% 9%   
National State Banks 
Corporates 9,5% 18,4% 19,0% 28,9% 13,3% 16,7% 9,2% 20,1% 2,7% 14,4% 11,6% 22,8% 
SMEs       10,5% 12,6% 0,9% 2,9% 4,2% 7,9% 
Retail 7,1% 3,9% 6,7% 6,5% 13,4% 6,9% 5,7% 6,7% 9,0% 21,5% 8,2% 4,4% 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
Corporates 11,6% 33,8% 16,8% 44,9% 27,0% 44,9% 1,9% 27,6% 0,6% 13,1% 14,8% 42,4% 
SMEs   20,5% 27,8% 25,9% 26,4% 1,3% 9,1% 2,5% 17,3% 16,9% 41,8% 
Retail 13,3% 9,7% 12,0% 8,1% 20,3% 8,5% 4,6% 4,5% 6,3% 4,8% 13,4% 9,2% 
Wholesale and Investment Banks 
Corporates 0,0% 0,0% 0,4% 4,3% 10,7% 42,3% 0,1% 1,7% 0,0% 0,0% 2,4% 39,0% 
Retail 3,2% 27,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 1,3% 24,2% 
Large Retail Banks 
Corporates 3,8% 10,1% 6,5% 15,7% 24,7% 28,8% 3,3% 6,7% 1,6% 2,7% 8,5% 14,7% 
SMEs   7,4% 5,6% 19,7% 8,8% 2,3% 4,2% 3,2% 5,3% 9,7% 6,4% 
Retail 5,9% 7,1% 5,5% 6,0% 10,7% 6,7% 1,3% 3,3% 1,1% 10,8% 5,7% 7,4% 
Medium-Sized Retail Banks 
Corporates 3,8% 8,7% 5,3% 18,7% 24,7% 31,4% 3,6% 16,5% 0,5% 2,4% 8,1% 22,0% 
SMEs   9,0% 5,3% 25,2% 6,9% 4,2% 7,0% 3,0% 4,7% 11,2% 5,7% 
Retail 7,8% 8,5% 8,1% 13,3% 15,4% 8,8% 2,4% 7,0% 2,2% 7,4% 8,1% 13,6% 
Small Retail Banks 
Corporates 9,0% 25,9% 9,5% 24,4% 22,5% 43,6% 1,6% 24,4% 1,1% 6,5% 9,0% 39,3% 
SMEs   9,3% 19,5% 22,3% 12,4% 7,9% 27,6% 11,4% 17,2% 17,2% 16,0% 
Retail 12,8% 16,9% 11,7% 20,2% 17,3% 12,6% 4,3% 8,0% 4,4% 10,3% 11,0% 18,2% 
Other Wholesale and Investment Banks 
Corporates 5,1% 18,0% 4,7% 20,8% 17,6% 43,5% 9,3% 59,1% 1,2% 11,9% 7,2% 34,7% 
SMEs   18,2% 17,3% 25,3% 27,2% 7,2% 21,8% 9,2% 15,9% 16,9% 27,5% 
Retail 14,5% 20,9% 16,7% 19,3% 21,0% 18,8% 8,8% 12,4% 0,9% 8,8% 13,1% 18,4% 
Provincial and Municipal Banks 
Corporates 9,8% 25,4% 15,4% 51,0% 18,4% 26,0% 11,7% 64,6% 6,6% 36,2% 13,0% 55,8% 
SMEs   14,0% 5,9% 29,0% 7,2% 4,8% 5,5% 15,6% 7,6% 18,0% 7,0% 
Retail 8,6% 7,6% 7,6% 6,9% 13,4% 7,4% 2,6% 4,2% 4,4% 5,4% 9,8% 34,4% 
 
Conditional Distributions 
The results of the simulated conditional distributions show that, across the 
economic cycle, the expected losses corresponding to the different portfolios are 
quite correlated, although their behaviour presents differences. Figures II, III and IV 
show the conditional expected losses for corporates, SMEs and the retail portfolio, by 
type of financial institution. As expected, conditional expected losses are cyclical: 
around 2% in years of high economic growth (such as 2003 and 2004), increasing in 
2001 up to 8% in the case of the retail portfolio and corporates and 10% for SMEs. It 
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is worth mentioning that by December 2001 the argentine economy had been in 
recession for three years, with real GDP falling 3.4% in 1999, 0.8% in 2000 and 4.4% 
in 2001. At the outset of the year 2002, the devaluation of the argentine Peso and the 
default of the public debt transformed the recession into a major crisis, with real GDP 
falling 11% that year. As a result of this, the expected loss rates conditional on the 
events of 2002 soared to 12% in the case of corporates and SMEs, and to 10% for 
the retail portfolio.  
Figure II. Conditional Expected Losses: Retail Portfolio 
 
Figure III. Conditional Expected Losses: SME Portfolio 
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Figure IV. Conditional Expected Losses: Corporate Portfolio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures II - IV above also show that the cyclical pattern of expected losses for 
each type of borrower is very similar across all the institutions, but it shows 
differences between types of borrowers. On the other hand, figures V, VI and VII 
below depict the behaviour of the conditional unexpected losses. In the case of the 
retail and SME portfolio, our results show that although the estimates react to the 
business cycle, they are less sensible to the state of the economy than the expected 
losses. With the exception of wholesale and investment banks, unexpected losses of 
the retail portfolio range between 0% and 10% during the three years comprised 
between 1999 and 2002, peaking slightly during 2001, and reduced subsequently to 
a range below 5% in years of high economic growth. The unexpected losses of 
SMEs present a similar pattern, although they take values up to 15% (on top of the 
expected losses) and the effect of the state of the economy on them seems to be 
even milder. Finally, corporate borrowers are much more responsive to the 
realizations of the systematic factor. With the exception of state-owned banks, the 
unexpected losses of this portfolio increased significantly during 2002 in response to 
the economic crisis, with unexpected losses in some cases above 20% of the 
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portfolio and on top of the expected losses. These findings regarding the higher 
sensitivity of corporate obligors to the realizations of the systematic factor and, 
conversely, the fact that defaults of retail and SME obligors are more idiosyncratic 
and less dependent on the economic cycle, are reflected in the calibration of the IRB 
approach, as explained in BCBS (2004).  
 
Figure V. Conditional Unexpected Losses: Retail Portfolio 
 
Figure VI. Conditional Unexpected Losses: SME Portfolio 
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Figure VII. Conditional Unexpected Losses: Corporate Portfolio 
 The findings regarding the conditional expected and unexpected losses shown 
thus far reflect the shifting of the loss distributions as a consequence of the 
realizations of the systematic factor. Those findings, also, reflect the higher loss 
volatility observed in bad years (recessions), and the lower volatility observed in good 
years (expansions of the economy). Figures VIII, IX and X show the impact of the 
systematic factor on (conditional) loss volatilities. 
Figure VIII. Conditional Loss Volatilities: Retail Portfolio 
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Figure IX. Conditional Loss Volatilities: SME Portfolio 
 
Figure X. Conditional Loss Volatilities: Corporate Portfolio 
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 While the three figures reflect the behaviour of unexpected losses through-the-
cycle, in all three cases our simulated loss volatilities show the expected behaviour, 
in the sense that in years of bad realizations of the systematic factor the loss volatility 
is higher, and lower in good years. 
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Unconditional Distributions 
In this sub-section we discuss the results obtained when computing the 
unconditional distributions, applying the resampling-based simulation to a chosen 
sub-set of borrowers but for the period 1999-2004 altogether. The resulting 
distribution can be understood as an average of the conditional distributions that 
correspond to different realizations of the systematic factor, weighted by the 
likelihood of occurrence of that particular realization. 
 Figure XI shows an example of the unconditional distribution of retail obligors 
of big retail banks. In the graph it can be seen how the conditional distributions shift 
according to the realizations of the systematic factor, with bad realizations shifting the 
conditional distributions to the right, increasing their mean (expected loss) and 
standard deviation. In the figure below the unconditional distribution is indicated with 
a grey area. 
 
Figure XI. Unconditional Distribution as Mixture of Conditional Distributions: 
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 The resulting estimations of unconditional expected and unexpected losses (at 
the 99.9% confidence level in the last case) are shown by type of borrower and bank 
in figures XII through XIV. 
 
Figure XII. Expected and Unexpected Unconditional Losses: Retail Portfolio 
 
 
 
 
Figure XIII. Expected and Unexpected Unconditional Losses: SME Portfolio 
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Figure XIV. Expected and Unexpected Unconditional Losses: Corporate 
Portfolio 
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tail distribution. As to the corporates, provincial and municipal banks have loss rates 
higher than 30% at a 99.9% Value-at-Risk, followed by the non-bank financial 
institutions and small retail banks. In general, the abovementioned differences in risk 
profiles may be attributed to differences in the granularity of the corresponding 
portfolios, in the respective obligors sensitivity to the systematic factor and in their 
risk management policies and tools (i.e., application and behavioural scorings). In 
this last case, it is worth mentioning that among the financial institutions with the 
highest risk profiles are some which may not seem proficient enough or with the 
necessary expertise with respect to the corresponding borrowers, such as wholesale 
and investment banks in the retail portfolio, non-bank financial institutions with SMEs 
and corporates and small retail banks with corporates.  
 
Comparison with a model-based approach: the advanced IRB 
Among other possible uses, the results obtained with this methodology can be 
compared with Basel IIs IRB approach. In what follows, we perform an exercise 
adapted from Majnoni, Miller and Powell (2004) in which we compare the capital 
requirements needed to cover unexpected losses at the 99.9% confidence level of 
our unconditional distributions, with those resulting from the IRB approach. Taking 
the estimated unconditional expected loss of any portfolio, assuming its 
corresponding default rate is a good proxy of the average PD of the obligors and that 
the exposure at default equals their outstanding debt, we find an implicit LGD. To 
perform this computations we use unconditional estimates since they incorporate the 
loss experience in adverse scenarios. With these risk dimensions we compute the 
(advanced) IRB capital requirements. The results, expressed as the ratio of the IRB 
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capital requirements to the Monte Carlo estimated capital requirements, are shown in 
Table V. 
Table V. IRB capital requirements vs. Non-parametric Monte Carlo based  
 
 
Corporates SMEs Retail 
National State Banks 0.8 3.4 2.5 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions 0.9 0.9 1.8 
Wholesale and Investment Banks 0.6 - 0.9 
Large Retail Banks 1.8 3.6 1.6 
Medium-Sized Retail Banks 1.0 4.1 1.2 
Small Retail Banks 0.6 2.0 1.2 
Provincial and Municipal Banks 0.5 5.0 0.5 
 
 The results show that, on average, the IRB yields capital requirements 
which would be insufficient to cover unexpected losses at the 99.9% confidence level 
for corporate obligors. This effect is particularly important for wholesale and 
investment, small retail and provincial and municipal banks. Besides suggesting a 
possible miscalibration of the IRB model, these results may reflect the fact that these 
banks portfolios are not sufficiently fine-grained. Conversely, for the retail and SME 
portfolios we find that the coverage produced by and IRB approach would be overly 
conservative, yielding capital requirements more than enough to cover unexpected 
losses at the 99.9% VaR. For example, in the case of large retail banks IRB capital 
requirements for SME obligors would be 260% larger than the unexpected losses, 
and 60% larger in the case of retail borrowers. Our results for corporates reinforce 
those obtained in Majnoni, Miller and Powell (2004) who also found that the IRB 
approach yielded insufficient coverage for corporate obligors. However, their 
resampled distributions included corporate and some SME obligors, did not control 
by type of bank (was performed for the whole financial system as a whole) and 
corresponded to the period 2000-2001 only.  
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V. Conclusions 
In this paper we used data of the public credit registry of the Central Bank of 
Argentina to implement a non-parametric method to estimate loan portfolio loss 
distributions. The method, which is a resampling-based Monte Carlo simulation, 
enabled us to obtain conditional distributions for the five 12-month periods comprised 
between 1999 and 2004, and an unconditional distribution for the whole period. In 
both cases, separate computations where performed by type of borrower and bank. 
In all cases the estimated distributions allow the computation of economic (risk-
based) measures of expected and unexpected losses for credit risk, to be covered 
with provisions and capital requirements. However, whether the supervisor must use 
conditional or unconditional measures to set the prudential regulation depends, 
among other factors, on the degree of risk sensitivity the regulation is expected or 
desired to show, and on the national supervisors leeway to deal with the prociclicality 
that conditional measures exacerbate.  
As it was explained during the paper, unconditional distributions can be 
interpreted as an average of the conditional distributions. Therefore, had the exercise 
in this paper included information of the years 2005 and 2006, in which the economy 
grew at 9.2% and 8.5% and with obligors average default rates at 3.2% and 3.6% 
respectively, the estimated unconditional expected and unexpected losses would 
have been lower than those here obtained (shown in tables III and IV). According to 
the information of the BCRA, while at the end of 2003 only 66% of the obligors of the 
financial system were risk classified as 1 (see Table I), by the end of 2006 that 
fraction had risen to 86%. Therefore, for this methodology to be useful in bank 
regulation and supervision it is of paramount importance that the model is computed 
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with a sample that covers a sufficiently long time period, and that its estimates are 
updated on a regular basis. 
The comparison between our resampled unconditional unexpected losses and 
the IRB capital requirements for the same portfolios allows to detect discrepancies 
between risk and coverage. These may be caused by less than sufficient granularity 
in banks portfolios or by problems in the calibration of the IRB. Our study shows 
there is a tendency of IRB capital requirements to exceed unexpected losses for 
SMEs and the retail portfolio, while they fall short in the case of corporate obligors. In 
this case, our findings support similar results obtained for corporate obligors of 
argentine banks in Majnoni, Miller and Powell (2004). 
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